Strengths: Kemba’s season was one long sigh of relief. Drafted in 2011 as one of the bedrocks of Charlotte’s rebuilding effort, his rookie year was a disappointment (in part for reasons beyond his control). The second year was much better.

A lot of that had to do with Walker’s improving efficiency (see Reasons for Optimism), but he also built on his strengths while taking on an expanded role:

— One of Kemba’s best attributes is his ballhandling, and that paid off in multiple ways. For one, he managed to keep his turnovers relatively low, especially given his role on the team, heavy minutes and a high usage rate. It also helped him put up points: According to MySynergySports.com, the pick-and-roll made up the largest percentage of his scoring plays, and his .87 points per possession was good for 32nd in the league. He also showed improvement in isolation, where Synergy rated him 85th among qualifying players. That gave the Bobcats a decently reliable one-on-one creator that it’s lacked in the past. It also led to some memorable moments.

— Walker still has a ways to go as a defender, but he has active hands and a good sense of timing. He was top-five in total steals, and top-10 in steal percentage among qualifying players. For a team that relied heavily on the fast break, Kemba’s ability to force turnovers came in handy.

— This is an underrated strength: Walker has proven to be very durable, and hasn’t missed a game in his two-year career. The streak continued this season despite a significant increase in playing time. Kemba saw 673 more minutes than his next-closest teammate, the equivalent of 14 48-minute games.

Kemba’s raw totals show off the impact increased playing time and consistent health can have. Walker played the 18th-most minutes in the league, which translated to the 15th-most points, 4th-most steals, 14th-most free throws made, and 19th-most assists. Looking at totals like that isn’t an especially accurate way of measuring a player’s impact on a game-by-game basis, but staying on the floor is its own talent. It also reflects just how heavy of a load Walker was carrying this year.

Weaknesses: Defense is Walker’s most glaring flaw; he’s always going to be undersized for the position, and he doesn’t have the strength to consistently fight through screens. As the team builds an identity on that end and improves their post defense, this will hopefully become less of an problem. A well-coached team can get by with subpar one-on-one defense from their point guard.

— This isn’t necessarily a “weakness,” but Walker has been an average passer so far. His assist percentage was 19th-best among qualifying players, comparable to point guards like Kyrie Irving, Stephen Curry and Ty Lawson. He’s decent enough that his passing isn’t a liability, but he didn’t show much growth this year, either. One thing that could help is acquiring a few more spot-up shooters; it’s hard to drive and kick when there’s no one to kick to. Similarly, Kemba didn’t have a good player to run the pick-and-roll with until Josh McRoberts showed up. As the team improves, it’ll be interesting to see how Walker’s passing game evolves.

Reasons For Optimism: Here’s the big one: Kemba’s field-goal percentage rose from a depressing 36.6 percent to a solid 42.3 percent. That’s about league-average for point guards (43 percent, according to Hoopdata.com). He accomplished it in two ways:

First, Walker improved his FG% on mid-range attempts from 35.0 to 43.4 percent. Kemba relied heavily on that shot, so it was an important development if he’s going to become half-way efficient.

Second, Walker did a better job at getting to the rim. Everyone loves charts, right? Here’s Kemba’s shot distribution in 2011-12:

And here’s 2012-13:

Kemba shifted nearly 10 percent of his shots to within eight feet of the basket. In short, this year Walker took better attempts and improved at the ones he already relied on. That’s a formula for solid (and hopefully sustainable) growth.

— This could be less of a reason for optimism and more of a statistical quirk, but Kemba was much, much better at home than on the road. More charts:

This gist is that Kemba scored more, and much more efficiently, when he was in Charlotte.

For reference, the league averages 45.95 percent from the field at home and 44.60 percent away. That’s a difference of 1.35 percent; Walker shot 6.6 percent better at home. The biggest shift was his three-point shooting, where he went from terrible on the road (26.8 percent) to very good at home (37.8 percent).

Like I said, this could just be randomness in the numbers. But if Kemba can get over his road jitters and find a consistent, high-percentage three-point stroke, it’d go a long way towards making him a complete offensive player.

Reasons For Pessimism: Kemba’s biggest strength is his mid-range game, and he didn’t develop much as a long-range shooter. That ultimately limits his efficiency, and in the short term created some major spacing issues while playing next to Ramon Sessions, Gerald Henderson and Michael Kidd-Gilchrist. If he can’t improve on his three-pointers, he’ll top out as a relatively inefficient volume scorer.

It’s also unclear how Walker will play in a more structured offense. Dunlap’s system allowed him to dominate the ball for long stretches, and didn’t feature much ball movement. The year before was similarly chaotic. If the incoming coach installs an offense that requires Walker to be more of a spot-up shooter, he could see his production deflate.

I’m trying to end these recaps on a positive note, so here you go: even if Kemba doesn’t pan out to be a long-term starter, he seems like a legitimate NBA player. You can’t complain too much about a solid contributor with a few elite skills, good potential and a strong work ethic (though I’m sure some will try).

Strengths: MKG’s most immediate and obvious strength this year was his rebounding. On a team that desperately needed help there, he pulled down a very solid 8.1 rebounds per 36 minutes. Those don’t appear to be empty numbers, either: When he was on the floor, Charlotte’s total rebound percentage improved from an average of 47.8 percent to 49.7 percent. That bump might look modest, but it’s the difference between being the second-worst rebounding team in the NBA and one that’s almost exactly league-average. The improvement on the boards helped spark the offense, as well, as the team had significantly more second-chance points with Kidd-Gilchrist on the floor.

His defense was also a plus. Just using the eye test, MKG did a good job of sticking with his man and providing help where he could. While MySynergySports.com grades him out as an average defender overall, there were certain areas where he shined. In isolation, MKG gave up .67 points per possession, good for a top-50 ranking. He was similarly talented at defending the ball handler in pick-and-roll situations and in post-ups, showing his versatility. For a player that could potentially bounce back and forth between the forward positions, holding his own in the post is a very promising sign. As he gains an improved feel for team defense (and the team’s defense improves in general), he has a good chance at blossoming into the elite defender Charlotte hoped it was getting.

Weaknesses: Kidd-Gilchrist’s biggest flaw is pretty glaring: his jumpshot is painful to watch. It’s not very effective, either. On mid-range shots, MKG only converted 29.6 percent of his attempts. For forwards with at least 100 attempts from mid-range, the average was 40 percent — Kidd-Gilchrist was only better than four of the 75 players that qualified. (Weird statistical footnote: MKG was actually marginally better than fellow rookies Anthony Davis [!] and Harrison Barnes [!?!]. Don’t read too much into that, though.) It’s a significant limitation, and how much it improves over the next few years will determine how high his ceiling really is.

MKG could also stand to tighten up his handle. Too often, he’d get the ball in the high post with room to operate, then defer and pass off to a teammate. Other times, he’d begin a drive only to lose control and cough up the ball. According to Synergy, in situations where MKG was the ball handler in the pick-and-roll, he turned it over 22 percent of the time. I’d rather see a confident and aggressive Kidd-Gilchrist, but he’ll need to work on limiting those giveaways.

Reasons for Optimism: Here’s what Grantland’s Zach Lowe wrote about Kidd-Gilchrist on Jan. 3, just 30 games into the season:

Damian Lillard has earned front-runner status [for Rookie of the Year], but Kidd-Gilchrist deserves real consideration. Given their three-year age gap, it’s not surprising there are some folks around the league who would prefer to build around MKG for the long haul.

Good to hear! But a lot changed after that article was published, with MKG slumping in January and suffering a terrifying concussion to start February. He didn’t miss many games following the injury, but his play continued to slide: After shooting 51 percent in the first two months of the season, Kidd-Gilchrist only made 31 percent of his attempts in February’s 10 games. Though he refused to make excuses for the poor stretch, he admitted that he was still recovering in early March. He bounced back in March and April, shooting a relatively efficient 47 percent through the final 24 games of the year.

If you want to be optimistic about Kidd-Gilchrist, you’d probably look to the first chunk of the year as your justification. What changed as the season went on?

Digging into the numbers shows part of the reason why Kidd-Gilchrist’s efficiency took a dip. Here’s his shot selection through 30 games, when he was shooting 51 percent:

A very high percentage of shots came within eight feet of the basket, where he was shooting 62 percent. Much fewer came from mid-range, where he didn’t have much confidence.

Here’s the rest of the year, where he shot 42 percent overall:

While it was still his bread and butter, we see fewer attempts near the rim and an increased emphasis on jump shots. Even though it helped make him a less efficient scorer, it was an important step: MKG can’t camp the lane forever, and if he wants to grow as a player he’ll need to step outside his comfort zone (figuratively and literally).

So, how did that go? Here’s the chart for Kidd-Gilchrist’s shooting performance in the first 30 games of the season:

It’s about what you’d expect: Good near the basket, bad everywhere else (in admittedly limited attempts). Over that stretch, MKG hit only 24.6 percent of his 65 mid-range attempts.

Here’s the final 30 games:

Is that some yellow outside the paint? And a green spot! To close the season, MKG made 36 percent of his final 91 mid-range attempts. It’s not quite average for his position, but it’s a hell of a lot better than 24.6 percent. (His form is still hideous, though.)

Those aren’t the largest samples to draw from, so I wouldn’t make any definitive conclusions about MKG’s jumper — we’ll have to wait until next year to see if an offseason of reps can improve his consistency. But it’s still encouraging, and it’s at least a hint at growth from a young, developing player. As a defender and all-around contributor, Kidd-Gilchrist already seems relatively well-formed. If he can continue to improve on both ends, he could be special.

Reasons for Pessimism: If he doesn’t continue to improve on both ends, he’ll wind up as a role player. That’s fine (the world needs role players), but it’s obviously not what you’d like from your second overall pick.

Even if MKG becomes a competent shooter from mid-range, it’s unlikely that he’ll ever be great from distance. That will probably be a problem moving forward: the league in general is taking more three-pointers than ever, and efficient offenses tend to focus on the restricted area and shots from beyond the arc. Kidd-Gilchrist has a lot of work ahead of him if he wants to become a complete player; it’ll be interesting to see where he ends up.

I’d rather not end this report card on a down note, though, so here’s Kidd-Gilchrist dunking Greg Monroe’s face off.

Strengths: For Byron, we might be better off calling this “Areas of Improvement” rather than “Strengths.” This year saw a fundamental change in the way Mullens was played; instead of relying on the long midrange jumper, he drastically increased his three-point attempts (5.2 per 36 vs. 1.3 last year). It’s a good idea in theory, since the three-pointer is a more efficient shot and it gave Kemba Walker, Gerald Henderson, Michael Kidd-Gilchrist and Ramon Sessions more room to operate in the paint. (For the reality, see Weaknesses.)

Even though Mullens was a below-average rebounder overall, he made significant strides on his defensive rebounding. He grabbed 22 percent of the available defensive boards when he was on the floor, the highest mark on the team and a good rate overall for a power forward. The Bobcats were one of the worst defensive rebounding teams in the league, so there are caveats there, but he still showed an improved aggressiveness on that end.

Mullens also made minor gains in other areas. His rebounding percentage overall got a slight bump (13.5 percent TRB, up from 12.8 percent TRB last year), and he showed some growth in his passing. As a result of his additional three-point attempts, he also saw a very minor increase in his eFG% (43.5 percent last year vs. 44.4 percent this year, which is still really bad).

Weaknesses: Woof. Where to start?

The three-point experiment was a mixed bag, at best — even with the shift in his shot selection, Mullens was a very inefficient player. As mentioned above, his eFG% of 44.4 percent was dismal, ranking 146th out of 191 forwards this year.

Part of the issue was Byron’s sometimes passive play. He’s actually decent at finishing around the basket, converting 62 percent of his shots in the restricted area over the past two years, but he spent a little too much time lounging outside the arc instead of fighting for shots inside. Some of that is the offensive scheme and falls on coaching, but we know that Dunlap was at least trying to get Mullens in the post more often. If three-point shots are replacing mid-range attempts, that’s ultimately good for a player’s efficiency. But only 29 percent of Mullens’ attempts came in the paint this year, compared to 38 percent last year. That’s a trend in the wrong direction.

Mullens’ rebounding and defense were also issues. Part of that, again, is the way he’s used: his poor offensive rebounding drags down his overall numbers, but it’s hard for him to get those boards when he plays away from the basket.

He doesn’t have much of an excuse for his defense, however. The team was substantially worse on that end when Mullens played, with their defensive rating dropping from an average of 108.9 to 113 when he was on the court. The frontcourt combo of Mullens and Biyombo seems athletic enough to play solid team defense, but the fundamentals just don’t seem to be there for either at this point.

(Random side note: In the 470 minutes that Mullens and Ben Gordon played together, the team’s defensive rating was an eyepopping 125.8. They should maybe limit how often those two are on the court at the same time.)

Reasons for Optimism: The stretch power forward is becoming more and more common in the NBA, especially as teams have shifted to smallball lineups and increased their share of three-point shots. Still, it’s relatively rare for a seven-footer to hit even 30 percent of his three-pointers, so Mullens does have some value.

If he returns next year, a reduced role and better shot selection could help Mullens improve his efficiency. His defensive issues and inconsistency would be a lot easier to hide in 15 minutes a game, as well.

Reasons for Pessimism: In a team context, Mullens just does not look very good. Overall offensive and defensive ratings declined when he was on the court, as did team rebounding and true shooting. Part of the appeal of a big man that shoots threes is the way it opens up looks inside for other players; that just didn’t materialize with Byron. Given how he’s struggled to defend, he’ll need to grow into an impact player on offense to justify a future with the team.

Depending on how the draft and free agency work out, I do think it’s likely Charlotte will sign Mullens to a qualifying offer. As flawed as he is, he’s still a young player with potential, and it will only cost the Bobcats $3.2 million to bring him back. That’s more than he’s worth at this point, but cap space shouldn’t be an issue this offseason. All that said, unless we see a significant jump from him, I’d bet next season is his last.